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Access to the Courts: An Essay for the Georgetown 
University Law Center Conference on the 
Independence of the Courts 
DAVIDS. UDELL AND REBEKAH DILLER* 
ABSTRACT 
In this Essay, we argue that the gap between Americas promise of equal justice and the 
reality of justice on the ground is substantial, and growing. Meaningful access to the 
courts-consisting of representation by counsel, the ability to physically enter court and 
understand and participate in the proceedings, and the opportunity to have claims heard-is 
increasingly out of reach for many Americans. First, there are not enough lawyers 
available to represent /ow-income people in civil legal matters, resulting in four-fifths of 
the civil legal needs of low-income individuals going unmet. Second, in the criminal justice 
system, where the right to counsel for the indigent is constitutionally guaranteed, attorneys 
are commonly underpaid, under-supervised, under-resourced and, ultimately, unable to 
provide effective representation. Third, for people with physical or psychiatric disabilities, 
court buildings and court procedures pose obstacles that may be insumwuntable. Fourth, 
for people with limited English proficiency, the lack of translation and interpreting services 
in many of the nations courts also poses barriers that are often overwhelming. Fifth, the 
role of the courts is increasingly circumscribed by laws and by court decisions that 
eliminate whole categories of claims from the courts' jurisdiction. Sixth, increased and 
often mandatory reliance on alternative dispute resolution has placed judicial review out of 
reach for an increasing number of people. These six factors, we argue, daily threaten the 
ability of our courts to perform their essential functions: providing predictable and fair 
dispute resolution, acting as a check on the legislative and executive branches, protecting 
the most vulnerable from the excesses of majoritarianism, and reaffirming the citizenrys 
faith in the legitimacy of the courts and of government in general. Finally, we conclude by 
offering a set of policy solutions aimed at stabilizing our courts, promoting their indepen-
dence, and fulfilling the promise of equal justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our nation's promise of "equal justice for all" is among its proudest tradi-
tions. American courts afford a forum for individuals to settle disputes in a civil 
manner, under the rule of law. Courts ensure predictability so that individuals 
and businesses can tailor their actions accordingly; contracts, for example, are 
binding because courts exist to enforce them. In our tripartite system of 
government, courts act as a check on the ability of the legislative and executive 
branches to accumulate excessive power. They protect the most vulnerable 
among us and curb the excesses of majoritarianism. Finally, courts reaffirm the 
citizenry's faith in the equal application of the laws and thus in the legitimacy of 
government in general. 
In order for "equal justice for all" to be more than a hollow promise, people 
require access to the courts that is meaningful, with representation by qualified 
counsel; the opportunity to physically enter the court and to understand and to 
participate in the proceedings; and the assurance that their claims will be heard 
by a fair and capable decisionmaker and decided pursuant to the rule of law. Yet 
these features of meaningful access to the courts are increasingly absent. The 
gap between the promise of equal justice and the reality of justice on the ground 
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is substantial, and growing, for the following reasons: 
• There are not enough lawyers available to represent low-income 
people in civil legal matters. As one scholar has noted, "[a]ccording 
to most estimates, about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of low-
income individuals, and two- to three-fifths of the needs of middle-
income individuals remain unmet."1 
• In the criminal law context, where counsel is guaranteed by the 
Supreme Court's 1963 landmark Gideon v. Wainwright2 decision, the 
promise has gone unfulfilled. Counsel for the indigent is commonly 
underpaid, under-supervised, under-resourced and, ultimately, unable 
to provide effective representation. 
• For people with physical or psychiatric disabilities, court buildings 
and court procedures pose barriers that may be insurmountable. 
• For people with limited English proficiency, the lack of translation 
and interpreting services in many of the nation's courts also can be 
insurmountable. 
• The role of the courts is increasingly circumscribed by laws and by 
court decisions that eliminate whole categories of claims from the 
courts' jurisdiction. 
• Increased and often mandatory reliance on alternative dispute resolu-
tion has placed judicial review out of reach for an increasing number 
of people. 
To be sure, more lawyers and more litigation are not necessarily desirable 
ends. Anyone who has ever been involved in litigation is aware of its limita-
tions-the expense, the complexity, the delay, and the ways in which human 
concerns can be filtered out of the process. Rising caseloads counsel against the 
creation of yet more grounds for lawsuits. We need our public institutions and 
our courts to require less, rather than more, reliance on lawyers. Long-term 
goals for reform must include simplifying access and promoting fair alternative 
dispute resolution systems, not just providing a lawyer to everyone or making 
more cases litigable. 
But the opportunity to resolve disputes within a court pursuant to the rule of 
law remains essential in a broad range of matters involving the concerns of 
low-income individuals. Just as a person of substantial means would never 
dream of buying a home or seeking a divorce without consulting a lawyer, 
persons of modest means likewise enter into life-altering transactions for which 
consultation with counsel is essential. For people of limited financial means, 
access to an attorney can be the difference between losing a home or keeping it, 
I. Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
369, 371 (2004). 
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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suffering from domestic violence or finding refuge, succumbing to illness or 
obtaining a cure, remaining hungry or securing food, or languishing in prison or 
reuniting with family and community. 
The judiciary is often the only institution situated to resolve civil disputes. 
Indeed, it is the unique guardian of individuals' civil legal rights against 
excessive assertions of power by the executive and legislative branches. As 
decisions related to the War on Terror have demonstrated yet again, the courts 
can and do function as an essential bulwark of liberty-affording those accused 
of the worst crimes their only opportunity to establish their innocence and 
acting as a check on overreaching by the executive branch. 
As we demonstrate below, for far too many people, access to the courts is 
illusory. Meaningful access to the courts consists of several elements. Chief 
among them in our adversarial system of justice is access to an attorney who 
can vigorously represent her client. Because courts rely upon a presentation of 
the issues and facts by each side's lawyers to reach a decision, lopsided justice 
results when one side is unrepresented. Moreover, even when they are paid for 
by the government, lawyers for low-income individuals must have the full range 
of legal tools available to any other lawyer, lest the functioning of the court 
system be warped. Public defenders must be adequately funded to mount 
aggressive defenses, lest representation be reduced to the mere appearance 
thereof. 
Of course, even access to a lawyer is of limited value when an individual is 
unable to enter the courthouse or understand the proceedings. For our system to 
deliver justice, courts must be accessible to persons with disabilities. Also, 
individuals with limited English proficiency must be able to obtain translation 
services. Finally, the courts themselves must actually possess the power to hear 
the claims presented to them. When courts are stripped of jurisdiction over 
certain types of claims, individual rights cannot be vindicated. Moreover, when 
the jurisdiction-stripping is the product of legislative or executive overreach, the 
delicate balance of power among the three branches of government is disturbed. 
As a result, individuals, society, the courts, and the promise of equal justice 
suffer. 
I. MOST Low-INCOME INDIVIDUALS CANNOT OBTAIN COUNSEL IN CIVIL MATTERS 
Nearly three decades ago, President Jimmy Carter observed: "Ninety percent 
of our lawyers serve ten percent of our people. We are overlawyered and 
underrepresented."3 Concern for equal justice is shared across the political 
spectrum. In 1995, Senator Peter Domenici (R-NM) declared on the Senate 
floor, "I do not know what is wrong with the United States of America saying to 
the needy people of this country that the judicial system is not only for the rich. 
3. Rhode, supra note 1, at 371 (quoting President James E. Carter, Remarks at the 100th Anniversary 
Luncheon of the Los Angeles County Bar Association (May 4, 1978), in 64 A.B.A. J. 840, 842 (1978)). 
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What is wrong with that? ... That is what America is all about."4 A decade 
later, the National Association of Evangelicals, the nation's largest association 
of evangelical Christians, echoed these concerns in a letter to several congres-
sional leaders: "Without a helping hand from legal aid programs and the shared 
blessings of others, low-income families too often have no place else to tum for 
help .... God measures societies by how they treat the people at the bottom, and 
He teaches us to care for the poor and oppressed among us. "5 
Yet notwithstanding widespread acknowledgment of the problem, the crisis 
of representation for low-income people in civil cases persists, and grows 
worse, because of chronic funding shortages, state and federal restrictions, 
shortfalls in pro bono help, and a rollback of financial incentives for attorneys in 
private practice to bring critical cases. 
The major source of funding in the United States for legal aid in civil matters 
is the federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC), established by federal law in 
1974.6 The value in real dollars of the funding appropriated by Congress to LSC 
has declined dramatically over the last twenty-five years. In fiscal year 1981, 
Congress allocated $321.3 million to LSC, which at the time was seen as the 
level sufficient to provide a minimum level of access to legal aid in every 
county, although not enough to actually meet all the serious legal needs of 
low-income people.7 Adjusted for inflation, this "minimum access" level of 
funding would need to be about $687.1 million in 2005 dollars; yet Congress's 
LSC allocation for fiscal 2006 was a mere $326.5 million. 8 On average, every 
legal aid attorney, funded by LSC and other sources, serves 6861 people. In 
contrast, there is one private attorney for every 525 people in the general 
population.9 
The dramatic nature of the funding shortfall becomes even more apparent 
when U.S. legal aid funding is compared to that of other industrial democra-
cies, many of which spend at least twice as much per capita on legal aid, if 
not more. For example, during fiscal year 1998, combined federal, state, and 
local government funding for civil legal services for the poor in the United 
States was $600 million, or $2.25 per capita. 10 In contrast, England spends 
eleven times as much per capita on civil legal services, at $26.00 per person; 
the Netherlands spends four times as much, at $9.70 per person; and 
Germany and France spend at least twice as much, at $4.86 and $4.50 per 
4. 141 CoNG. REc. S14573-O2, S14587 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici). 
5. Letter from Rev. Richard Cizik, Vice President for Governmental Affairs, Nat'! Ass 'n of Evangeli-
cals, to Rep. Frank R. Wolf and Rep. Alan B. Mollohan (July 13, 2006) (on file with the Brennan Center 
for Justice). 
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996b (2000). 
7. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING 11iE JUSTICE GAP 1N AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL 
NEEDS OF Low-INCOME AMERICANS 2 (2005). 
8. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 2 (2006). 
9. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 7, at 18. 
IO. Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United 
States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S83, S95 (2000). 
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person, respectively. 11 
As a result of money shortfalls, in 2004 LSC-funded programs turned away at 
least one person seeking help for each person served. 12 This means that 
approximately one million cases per year are turned away due to lack of 
funding. 13 As striking as these figures are, they understate the real number of 
low-income people who go unserved because they do not include those who do 
not seek out help, those who were turned away from non-LSC-funded legal aid 
providers, or those who received limited advice but required full representation. 
In addition to these consequences of funding shortages, the ability of legal aid 
programs to serve the poor is further impeded by harsh and wasteful federal 
restrictions imposed by Congress in 1996. These restrictions cut deeply into 
low-income people's capacity to secure meaningful access to the courts. First, 
Congress restricted the legal tools that LSC-funded lawyers could use to 
represent their clients, prohibiting them from: representing clients in bringing 
class actions; seeking court-ordered attorneys' fee awards; educating potential 
clients about their rights and then offering to represent them; and communicat-
ing with policymakers or legislators on a client's behalf, except under very 
narrow circumstances. 14 
Second, Congress limited the categories of clients whom LSC-funded pro-
grams could represent, prohibiting representation of certain categories of 
legal immigrants as well as all undocumented immigrants, people in prison, 
and those charged with illegal drug possession in public housing eviction 
proceedings. 15 
Finally, Congress imposed an extraordinarily harsh and largely unprec-
edented limitation on LSC-funded programs: it extended these prohibitions to 
the non-LSC-funded activities of legal aid programs. As a result, nearly $390 
million in state, local, and private funding for legal aid is restricted under the 
same terms as the LSC funds. 16 Faced with a court ruling that such a sweeping 
restriction on private funds violates the First Amendment, LSC issued a regula-
tion that theoretically provides an opportunity for non-profits receiving LSC 
funds to spend their private money free of these substantive restrictions. 17 
Under LSC's "program integrity" regulation, the only way a legal aid non-profit 
and its private donors may free themselves of the federal restrictions is to divert 
private funds from direct client service in order to establish a separate program-
11. Id. 
12. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 7, at 5. 
13. Id. 
14. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
§ 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 to -56. Congress has carried forward these restrictions each year, with 
minor modifications, by incorporating them in the annual appropriations rider for LSC. 
15. See id. at 1321-55 to -56. 
16. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., FACT BooK 2005, at 9-10 (2006), available at http://www.rin.lsc.gov/ 
Rinboard/2005FactBook.pdf. 
17. See Use of Non-LSC Funds, Transfers of LSC Funds, Program Integrity, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,695, 
27,695 (May 21, 1997) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1610 (2005)). 
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with physically separate staff, offices, and equipment. 18 However, this physical 
separation requirement is so burdensome and wasteful that virtually no program 
in the country has been able to comply. 
Apart from the restrictions and funding shortages, the reach of LSC-funded 
programs is inherently limited by their mandate to serve those in the most dire 
need. To be eligible for assistance from LSC recipient programs, clients must 
earn less than 125% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines. 19 In real terms, a family 
of four living in the forty-eight contiguous states with a household income that 
exceeds $25,000 is ineligible for assistance from LSC-funded programs.20 Asset 
ceilings also apply. 
Thus, many working poor and middle-income families find themselves in a 
bind when they have a legal problem. A study commissioned by the American 
Bar Association (ABA) and issued in 1994 found that about one-half of 
moderate-income households at any given time face a problem that could be 
addressed by the courts.21 However, with the exception of family law matters 
such as divorce, the usual course of action for such households was to try to 
handle the situation on their own, without a lawyer.22 Middle-income families 
also lack one of the advantages businesses have in being able to afford lawyers: 
while legal fees are tax deductible when incurred as a business expense, they 
are not when incurred for personal reasons. 23 
Pro bono-free or reduced-fee legal assistance by private law firms-
provides some relief. Yet notwithstanding the considerable resources of major 
law firms and the sheer number of attorneys in the United States, pro bono 
practice falls far short of meeting the legal needs of America's low- and 
middle-income families. Pro bono participation is quite low. The average 
attorney donates less than a half-hour per week to pro bono service, and 
financial contributions average less than fifty cents per day. 24 Less than one-
third of the nation's major law firms meet the ABA's pro bono challenge of 
donating three to five percent of total revenues.25 Moreover, a substantial 
proportion of pro bono service is done for family or friends, not for low-income 
18. See 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8 (2005). 
19. See 45 C.F.R. § 161 l.3(c)(l) (2005). 
20. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611 app. A (2005). 
21. ROY w. REESE & CAROLYN A. ELDRED, ThMPLE UNIV. INST. FOR SURVEY RESEARCH, LEGAL NEEDS 
AMONG Low-INCOME AND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHEN-
SIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 8 (1994). 
22. Id. at 2 I. 
23. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (Supp. 2006) (allowing deduction of all "ordinary and necessary expenses" 
incurred in the course of business); Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 690-91 (1966) (holding that 
litigation expenses for an underwriter's defense of a criminal prosecution for securities fraud were 
deductible under section 162(a)); Gilliam v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 515 (1986) (holding that 
litigation expenses growing out of an artist's defense of a civil tort claim were personal and not 
deductible under section 162(a) even though the underlying events took place on a business trip). 
24. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 17 (2004). 
25. Id. The ABA Model Rules on Professional Conduct establish an aspiration that lawyers will 
"render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year," a "substantial majority" of 
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communities. 26 Fewer than one in ten attorneys accept referrals from legal 
services programs or other organizations that serve the legal needs of low-
income communities. 27 
A recent rollback in the availability of attorneys' fees further threatens the 
ability of those who have suffered civil rights violations to bring claims. In an 
effort to ensure that attorneys are available to bring cases under laws designed 
to vindicate civil rights and deter government wrongdoing, Congress has autho-
rized successful civil rights claimants suing under certain statutes to have their 
attorneys' fees paid for by their opponents.28 However, the courts recently have 
narrowed the circumstances under which parties will be deemed to have won 
such cases and thus be eligible to collect an attorneys' fee award. 
In the past, plaintiffs could collect a fee award when their lawsuits served as a 
"catalyst" for legislative or policy change that resolved the dispute, even if the 
plaintiffs never formally "won" in court. However, a 2001 Supreme Court 
decision, Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of 
Health and Human Services,29 restricted the definition of "prevailing party" 
under two federal civil rights statutes to only those claimants who achieved 
some sort of official judicial recognition of their "victory" to recover fees. 30 
Since Buckhannon, most of the intermediate federal appeals courts have inter-
preted the holding broadly to apply to all civil rights statutes that contain the 
same "prevailing party" language at issue in Bukhannnon. 31 Similarly, a number 
which should be without fee to low-income communities. MODEL RULES OF P1mr'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 
(2002). However, Rule 6.1 is non-binding. 
26. See RHODE, supra note 24, at 17. 
27. Id. 
28. Suits under Titles II, VI, and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are covered by fee-shifting 
statutes, see 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000), as are suits under the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (2000), amended by Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King 
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577. 
Similarly, the Equal Access to Justice Act awards attorneys' fees against the government in all cases 
where, under the common law, attorneys' fees would be awarded between private parties and to a 
"prevailing party" in any action brought by or against the United States "unless the court finds that the 
position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award 
unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (d)(l)(A) (2000). 
29. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
30. Id. at 603. 
31. See Pamela S. Karlan, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at 
the University of Illinois College of Law (Apr. 1, 2002), reprinted as Disarming the Private Attorney 
General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 183, 187-88, 205--08 (noting that the catalyst theory has been eliminated 
from prevailing party discussions in most federal statutes); Kyle A. Loring, Note, The Catalyst Theory 
Meets the Supreme Court-Common Sense Takes a Vacation, 43 B.C. L. REv. 973, 993-98 nn.198-244 
(2002) (listing appeals court cases applying Buckhannon's prevailing party reasoning to reject fee 
applications premised on catalyst theory). Buckhannon has also been relied upon to limit recovery 
under the Equal Access to Justice Act. See Goldstein v. Moatz, 445 F.3d 747, 751 (4th Cir. 2006); Select 
Milk Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 
20, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2004); Scherer v. United States, 88 Fed. App'x 316, 320 (10th Cir. 2004); Pres. 
Coalition v. Fed. Transit Admin., 356 F.3d 444, 452 (2d Cir. 2004); Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. 
United States, 288 F.3d 1371 , 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791 , 793-94 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
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of state courts have relied on Buckhannon to restrict the definition of "prevail-
ing party" under state fee-shifting provisions. 32 As a result, attorneys have 
fewer incentives to bring cases that not only vindicate the rights of individuals 
but also further the societal goals of deterring discrimination and government 
abuse of power. 
The shortage of legal assistance that results from all these factors can have 
devastating consequences for low-income people. Perhaps nowhere can the impact of 
legal assistance be seen more dramatically than in the context of domestic violence 
cases. Take, for example, the case of Mariella Batista, a Cuban immigrant who had 
suffered for years from domestic violence by an abusive partner. Ten years ago, 
Batista sought help from a local legal services program. Even though she feared for 
her life, the program had to turn her away due to the 1996 LSC restriction that 
prohibited representation of most immigrants. The next week, Batista was killed by 
her abuser outside the family court building. 33 
Although Congress has since amended the LSC restrictions to allow for 
representation of domestic violence victims regardless of immigration status, 34 
the lesson persists: denial of access to a lawyer can have tragic consequences. In 
contrast, when legal services are made available, survivors of domestic violence 
have assistance obtaining protective orders, custody of their children, child 
support, and sometimes public assistance. Legal services programs help women 
achieve physical safety and financial security and thus empower them to leave their 
abusers. In fact, one recent study found that access to legal services was one of the 
primary factors contributing to a twenty-one percent decrease nationally in the re-
ported incidence of domestic violence between 1993 and 1998.35 
The consequences of inadequate access to the courts affect not just the 
individuals directly involved, but also society at large. When families are 
evicted from their homes because they cannot obtain counsel in a housing 
32. See Annabelle Chan, Comment, The Buckhannon Stops Here: Buckhannon Board & Care 
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services Should Not Apply to the New 
York Equal Access to Justice Act, 72 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1341, 1364-65 (2004) (citing Taylor v. Lenoir, 
558 S.E.2d 242, 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (applying Buckhannon interpretation to North Carolina 
common fund doctrine) and Wallerstein v. Stew Leonard's Dairy, 780 A.2d 916, 919 (Conn. 2001) 
(applying Buckhannon interpretation of "prevailing party" to state product liability fee-shifting provi-
sion)); see also Tibbetts v. Sight n' Sound Appliance Ctrs., Inc., 77 P.3d 1042, 1052 (Okla. 2003) 
(applying Buckhannon interpretation to state consumer protection fee-shifting provision); Direct Action 
for Rights & Equality v. Gannon, 819 A.2d 651,660 (R.I. 2003) (applying Buckhannon interpretation to 
state access to public records fee-shifting provision). But see DeSalvo v. Bryant, 42 P.3d 525, 530 
(Alaska 2002) (noting that the catalyst theory may still apply to state statutes despite Buckhannon); 
Graham v. DairnlerChrysler Corp., No. Bl52928, 2002 WL 31732556, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 
2002) (holding that a California fee-shifting statute was not affected by Buckhannon). 
33. See Leslye Orloff et al., Opening a Door to Help: Legal Services Programs' Key Role in 
Representing Battered Immigrant Women and Children, CLEARINGHOUSE REv., May-June 2003, at 36, 
36. 
34. Violence Against Women & Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-162, § 104, 119 Stat. 2960, 2978-79 (2005). 
35. Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, Explaining the Recent Decline in Domestic Violence, 21 
CONTEMP. EcoN. PoL'Y 158, 169 (2003). 
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proceeding, for example, their resultant homelessness costs taxpayers in the 
form of public services.36 In New York City, the average cost of sheltering a 
single homeless adult is $23,000 annually-far more than providing counsel to 
prevent an eviction.37 Medical and other costs rise, too, when individuals, 
particularly senior citizens, lose their homes because they lack access to a 
lawyer. When victims of domestic violence are unable to obtain help, the health 
care, criminal justice, and social welfare systems bear the strain. 38 Employers, 
too, suffer from decreased productivity and increased absenteeism.39 Many of 
these societal costs could be ameliorated if low-income individuals had access 
to counsel to assist them in resolving their legal problems. 
II. THE PROMISE OF GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT-LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR 
Low-INCOME PERSONS IN CRIMINAL MATTERS-IS LARGELY UNFULFILLED 
In the 1963 landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court 
established that indigent criminal defendants have the right to an attorney, under 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, regardless of their 
abilities to pay.40 Yet notwithstanding the promise of Gideon, more than forty 
years later the criminal justice system in many states is largely broken due to 
inadequate funding of indigent defense services, crushing caseloads, and a lack 
of oversight, supervision, and training of court-appointed defense counsel. 
In 2003, in recognition of the fortieth anniversary of the Gideon decision, the 
ABA conducted four hearings across the country to examine the quality and 
consequences of indigent defense services in the nation. The ABA received 
testimony from a broad range of experts, documenting a stunning array of 
obstacles to enforcement of the Gideon right. The ABA's investigation culmi-
nated in publication of a report in 2004 titled Gideon's Broken Promise: 
America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice. 41 Among the obstacles identified 
by the experts were the following: 
36. See NANCY SMITH ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY HOMELESSNESS IN NEW 
YoRK CITY: AN IN-DEPl'H SrooY OF FAMll.lES' EXPERIENCES BEFORE AND AFTER SHELTER, § 3, at 13-14, 28 
(2005) (finding that almost half of all families in the New York City homeless shelter system had 
experienced an eviction in the five years preceding their admission to a shelter, and that being evicted 
made it seven times more likely that a household would enter a shelter that same month). 
37. Coalition for the Homeless, Research, Basic Facts about Homelessness, http://www.coalitionforthe 
homeless.org/advocacy/basic_facts.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). 
38. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993) ("[E]stimates suggest that we spend $5 to $10 billion a 
year on health care, criminal justice, and other social costs of domestic violence."). 
39. See H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 
1853 ("[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate 
commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in 
interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved, in interstate com-
merce ... [,] by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing 
the supply of and the demand for interstate products . .. . "). 
40. 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). 
41. AM. BAR Ass'N STANDING CoMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: 
AMElucA' s CONI1NUING QuEsT FOR F.QuAL JUSTICE (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE]. 
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• The lack of adequate funding for indigent defense services, leading 
to inadequate attorney compensation; lack of essential resources 
(including expert, investigative, and support services); lack of train-
ing; reliance on various cost cutting measures; and resource disparity 
between prosecution and indigent defense.42 
• ''Inadequate legal representation," including "meet 'em and plead 'em" 
lawyers; incompetent and inexperienced lawyers; excessive caseloads; 
lack of contact between defense counsel and clients (and lack of continuity 
in representation of clients); lack of investigation, research, and zealous 
advocacy by defense counsel; lack of conflict-free representation; and other 
ethical violations by defense counsel.43 
• "Structural defects in indigent defense systems," including insufficient inde-
pendence of counsel from courts and prosecutors and an absence of over-
sight sufficient to ensure the provision of uniform, quality legal services.44 
• Complete failure to provide counsel to those entitled to counsel: people 
detained in jail without a lawyer; people encouraged to waive their right to 
counsel and enter pleas of guilty; and counsel provided too late or not at 
all.45 
• A diverse range of additional problems, including inordinate delays in the 
criminal justice process; a lack of full-time public defenders and of participa-
tion by the private bar; and a lack of data regarding indigent defense 
systems.46 
Problems virtually identical to those identified in the ABA report have been 
the subject of numerous reports in many jurisdictions across the country, 
extending back decades in time.47 Most recently, the Chief Judge of the State of 
New York, Judith S. Kaye, appointed a blue ribbon commission that, after 
receiving testimony in a series of hearings, called for substantial reform of the 
defense services provided in New York State.48 As described in The New York 
Times, the commission identified "such problems as overburdened defenders 
who, in one county, average 1,000 misdemeanors and 175 felony cases in a 
year, and 'grossly inadequate' financing."49 The Commission further described 
42. Id. at 7-14. 
43. Id. at 14-20. 
44. Id. at 20-22. 
45. Id. at 22-26. 
46. Id. at 26-28. 
47. See id. at 7 n.39 (citing eight reports and articles from 1982 to 2004 on problems in indigent 
defense systems). 
48. See Danny Hakim, Judge Urges State Control of Legal Aid for the Poor, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 
2006, at B 1. According to William E. Hellerstein, a professor at Brooklyn Law School and a 
co-chairman of the commission, "Virtually every member of the commission has had long experience 
in the criminal justice system." Hellerstein added: "I think it's fair to say that despite our experience, 
we were somewhat taken aback by the depth and the extent of the crisis." Id. 
49. Id. 
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"wide disparities in counties' spending and in the resources available to prosecu-
tors and defenders," and noted that "[t]he state lacks standards to define what it 
means to provide adequate indigent defense and has no system for enforcing 
such standards."50 
The ABA report explains that inadequate defense lawyering is a cause of 
wrongful convictions: "Although there undoubtedly are a variety of causes of 
wrongful convictions-including police and prosecutorial misconduct, coerced 
false confessions, eyewitness identification errors, lying informants-inad-
equate representation often is cited as a significant contributing factor."51 The 
report further quotes former Attorney General Janet Reno stating that, 
[a] competent lawyer will skillfully cross-examine a witness and identify 
and disclose a lie or a mistake. A competent lawyer will pursue weaknesses in 
the prosecutor's case, both to test the basis for the prosecution and to 
challenge the prosecutor's ability to meet the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
A competent lawyer will force a prosecutor to take a hard, hard look at the 
gaps in the evidence . . . . 
A competent lawyer will know how to conduct the necessary investigation 
so that an innocent defendant is not convicted .. . . 
In the end, a good lawyer is the best defense against wrongful convic-
tion ... . 52 
The problem of wrongful convictions cannot be ignored. As of December 2006, 
the Innocence Project, a legal clinic at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 
had identified 188 persons as having been wrongfully convicted of crimes, and 
of having served more than 1000 years in prison as a result. 53 The discovery of 
additional wrongful convictions has become an almost daily occurrence. 
One example is Eddie Joe Lloyd, a mentally ill Michigan man who was 
convicted of the 1984 rape and murder of a teenage girl. While residing in a 
psychiatric hospital, Lloyd, who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and mild 
retardation, contacted police and made suggestions on how to solve this case 
and others. The police interrogated Lloyd and told him that, if he confessed to 
the murder, he would help them "smoke out" the real murderer. Lloyd then 
50. Id. 
51. GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 41 , at 3 n.25 (citing C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED 
BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICDON AND PuBLIC POLICY 76-77 (1996); BARRY SCHECK ET AL. , ACTUAL 
INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND 0rnER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 183-92 
(2000); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideons Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for 
Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 868 (2004)). 
52. Janet Reno, Att' y Gen., Remarks at the National Symposium on Indigent Defense 2000 (June 29, 
2000), in OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE 
2000: REDEFINING LEADERSHIP FOR EQUAL JusTICE vi-vii (2000), quoted in GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, 
supra note 41, at 3. 
53. See The Innocence Project Home Page, www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). 
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confessed to the crime in horrific detail by recounting facts fed to him by the 
police. Lloyd's court-appointed attorney failed to challenge the coerced confes-
sion in court. As a result, Lloyd spent seventeen years in prison before being 
exonerated by DNA evidence. Tragically, he died two years after his release 
from prison. 54 
When access to counsel in the criminal justice system is inadequate, society 
suffers as well. Convicting Eddie Joe Lloyd and others of crimes they did not 
commit enables the real perpetrators to remain at large. Moreover, taxpayers 
must foot the bill for lengthy appeals processes and the high costs associated 
with unnecessary and excessive incarceration. 
Against a backdrop of rampant noncompliance with Gideon and the attendant 
costs and consequences, it is encouraging to note that there are some signs of 
real change. Across the country, reform initiatives are beginning to hold states 
accountable under Gideon. The ABA report cites examples of successful initia-
tives in Georgia, Texas, and Virginia that have led to the creation of new 
statewide defender systems with increased state funding and state oversight. 55 
Additional reform efforts succeeded in Montana in 2005 and are underway in 
Louisiana, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania. 
III. COURTS OFTEN ARE UNABLE To PROVIDE ACCESS TO PEOPLE WITH PHYSICAL 
AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 
If the courts are to fulfill their essential role of protecting the most vulnerable 
people in our society, then the most vulnerable people must be able to get into 
court. People with physical and psychological impairments face unique chal-
lenges when attempting to vindicate their rights in court. Although the federal 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) aims to eradicate disability-based dis-
crimination in a variety of settings, one threshold question is whether the courts 
themselves are sufficiently accessible to enable individuals with disabilities to 
enter courthouses and to participate in court proceedings. 
Noncompliance with the ADA in state judicial systems has been widely 
documented.56 Surveys have found inaccessible courtrooms in California, Wash-
ington, Texas, New York, Tennessee, Missouri, and Florida. And, in some 
jurisdictions, inaccessible courtrooms are the norm.57 
The problems leading to this inaccessibility include: 
• Architectural barriers: many people have difficulty navigating court-
house facilities , including parking lots and bathrooms, as well as 
54. See Jodi Wilgoren, Confession Had His Signature; DNA Did Not, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at 
Al ; The Innocence Project: Eddie Joe Lloyd, http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display_profile. 
php?id= 110 (last visited Feb. 3, 2007). 
55. See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 41, at 29-35 . 
56. See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 
VAND. L. REV. I 807, 1857 (2005). 
57. See id. at 1857-58. 
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gaining access to assistive devices such as listening aids, print 
enlargers, etc. 
• Court practices: courts often impose inflexible scheduling require-
ments, including refusing to offer mid-morning or afternoon hearings 
for persons who need extra time to get to court. 
• Court officials: court personnel, including judges and clerks, may 
lack sufficient knowledge to prevent misunderstandings and to avoid 
reliance on mistaken stereotypes. 
• Signage: Court signage may be inadequate, making it difficult to 
obtain essential information, or to obtain assistance in completing 
required forms. 58 
For individuals with psychiatric impairments, analogous problems arise. 
Individuals may be unable to handle the stress of courtroom proceedings, the 
challenges of communicating with courthouse officials and judges, and the daily 
effects of medications. 59 
In 2004, the Supreme Court held in Tennessee v. Lane60 that individuals are 
entitled to sue state court systems for their failure to comply with the ADA.61 
George Lane had sued Tennessee for failing to make the county courthouse 
accessible to persons who rely on wheelchairs. Lane had been jailed after he 
refused to crawl up the courthouse steps to attend a scheduled court appear-
ance.62 The Court rejected Tennessee's argument that it was immune from suit 
and held that Congress was within its power in enacting the ADA as a means of 
protecting the constitutional right of access to the courts. 63 
State court systems are cognizant of the need to address these problems. In a 
memorandum responding to the Lane decision, the National Center on State 
Courts identified forty-three court locations across the country where ADA 
compliance activities were ongoing.64 Additionally, the Architectural and Trans-
portation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board), an independent federal 
agency devoted to accessibility for people with disabilities, has created a 
Courthouse Access Advisory Committee to advise it on issues related to the 
accessibility of courthouses covered under the ADA. These issues include best 
practices, design solutions, promotion of accessible features, educational oppor-
tunities, and the gathering of information on existing barriers, practices, recom-
58. See Maryann Jones, And Access for All: Accommodating Individuals with Disabilities in the 
California Courts, 32 U.S.F. L. REv. 75, 91-95 (1997). 
59. See generally Jeanette Zelhof et al., Protecting the Rights of Litigants with Diminished Capacity 
in the New York City Housing Courts, 3 CARDOZO PuB. L. PoL' Y & ETHICS J. 733 (2006). 
60. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
61. See id. at 533-34. 
62. See id. at 514. 
63. See id. at 518,531. 
64. Memorandum from Jerry Kuban, Court Consulting Servs., Nat'! Center for State Courts, 
Response/Reaction to Tennessee v. Lane (June 16, 2004), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/ 
Publications/KIS_AmeDisResponseLanevTN. pelf. 
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mendations, and guidelines.65 Nevertheless, substantial work remains to make 
courthouses more accessible to persons with disabilities. 
IV. COURTS OFTEN Do NOT PROVIDE TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETING SERVICES 
TO PEOPLE WHO HAVE A LIMITED ABILITY To SPEAK AND UNDERSTAND ENGLISH 
There is another particularly vulnerable segment of society-those people 
with limited proficiency in English (often known as LEP individuals)-that is 
frequently confronted with virtually insurmountable obstacles to accessing the 
courts. LEP individuals often are unable to communicate with court personnel, 
to conduct legal research, to read their opponents' legal papers, and to under-
stand and participate in court proceedings. 
A recent California study found that "courtroom language services [i.e. 
interpreters] are virtually unavailable to many Californians."66 Most court 
documents, such as standard pleadings, legal opinions, and self-help materials, 
are written in English only, making them incomprehensible to LEP individu-
als. 67 
In California alone, there are seven million people who cannot access the 
courts without language assistance.68 The practical consequences for the court 
system are enormous. In Los Angeles County, approximately 10,000 proceed-
ings each year are postponed because there is no interpreter available.69 These 
problems are particularly acute in rural areas, where often there is no certified 
interpreter available to speak the necessary language.70 When no interpreter can 
be found at all, judges must attempt to reach a fair and accurate decision 
knowing that they cannot communicate with one or more of the litigants. For 
this reason, the Judicial Council of California recently called the participation of 
interpreters in domestic violence proceedings "a fundamental factor contribut-
ing to the quality of justice."71 
These problems generally stem from the courts' inadequate resources. Re-
sponding to the conclusion of the California Access to Justice Commission that 
California's courts generally failed to provide access to LEP individuals, the 
Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, Ronald George, said that he did 
not perceive "any immediate prospect" of obtaining funds to alleviate the 
65. See generally Courthouse Advisory Committee Home Page, http://www.access-board.gov/caac/ 
index.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). 
66. CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, LANGUAGE BARRIERS TO JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 9 (2005), 
available at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/reports/2005_Language-Barriers_Report.pdf. 
67. See id. at 18. 
68. Id. at 1 n.2. 
69. Id. at 23. 
70. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYs., CouRT INTERPRETING IN NEW YoRK: A PLAN OF ACTION 1 
(2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courtinterpreter/action_plan.pdf. 
71. ADMIN. OFFICE OF TIIE COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., FAMILY LAW INTERPRETER PILOT 
PROGRAM: REPoRT TO TIIE LEGISLATURE 2 (2001), available at www.courtinfo.ca.gov/prograrns/cfcc/pdffiles/ 
FLIPP.PDF. 
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problem. 72 The complicated logistics of providing language access contributes 
to the problem. In New York State alone, litigants speak 168 different languages 
and many more dialects.73 Courts must ensure that the interpreters appearing in 
their courts are competent. Court interpreters must be proficient not only in the 
two languages they are translating between, but also in the legal terminology of 
each language. Unfortunately, in many instances, even when court interpreters 
are available they lack the requisite proficiency and provide incorrect transla-
tions. 74 
V. COURTS HAVE HAD THEIR JURISDICTION STRIPPED AND ARE LESS AVAILABLE 
THAN EVER To HEAR CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF CASES 
The last two decades have witnessed a substantial narrowing of the scope of 
the courts' authority to enforce laws when individual litigants raise claims of 
unlawful conduct by the government. The effects of this eroded jurisdiction are 
widespread and long lasting. Principles and expectations are established that can 
affect the development of the law in related areas for years to come. 
Some of the retrenchment is a product of the Supreme Court's own decisions. 
Under the banner of the so-called "new federalism," the Court has declared that 
the federal government lacks sufficient constitutional power to authorize some 
suits against the states for civil rights violations. These decisions have limited 
the ability of the disabled and senior citizens to seek redress against state 
employers for discrimination 75 and have provided a rationale that more broadly 
threatens the continued enforcement of federal civil rights against the states. 
Other Supreme Court decisions have ruled that individuals may not bring claims 
to enforce civil rights either because the statute did not explicitly authorize such 
a claim76 or because such claims were not sufficiently related to Congress's 
constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. 77 
Other limitations result from actions of the executive or legislative branches. 
We highlight below several particular contexts in which the executive or 
legislative branches have stripped courts of the power to hear claims: the War 
72. Claire Cooper, Interpreter Shortage Leaves Courts in a Bind, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 8, 2005, at 
Al (quoting State Chief Justice Ronald George). 
73. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT Svs., supra note 70, at 1. 
74. See CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 17-18, 22-23. 
75. See, e.g., Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (sharply circumscribing 
the ability of the disabled to bring claims against state employers under the ADA); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (similarly limiting the ability of senior citizens to sue state employers for 
damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
76. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that private individuals could not 
bring claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits race- and national 
origin-based discrimination, under a "disparate impact" theory, and could bring claims only under the 
much harder to prove intentional discrimination theory). 
77. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) (holding that Congress was not 
authorized under the Commerce Clause to create a private remedy for victims of gender-motivated 
violence to sue in civil court). 
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on Terror, immigrants' access to the courts, and the ability of prisoners to 
challenge the conditions of their confinement. 
These limitations on the courts' power are, of course, of particular concern to 
immigrants, prisoners, and those charged as terrorists. But the ultimate effects 
of these limitations will reach much further. The judicial branch is charged with 
protecting the most vulnerable in our society, who often cannot assert their 
rights through the political process. Consequently, the weakening of the Judi-
ciary through the War on Terror, the assault on immigrants' rights, and the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act threatens not only the direct targets of each action, 
but also everyone who turns to the Judiciary to protect their rights when the 
political process fails to do so. 
A. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAS SOUGHT TO REDUCE THE FUNCTION OF THE COURTS IN 
REVIEWING THE GOVERNMENT'S CONDUCT IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. military, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and allied nations have engaged in counter-
terrorism operations and detained hundreds, perhaps thousands, of individuals 
without the threshold of a lawful process to determine the factual or legal bases 
for detention. Although detainees have been tagged "the worst of the worst" by 
senior executive branch officials, a substantial number appear to have been 
incorrectly detained. During "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan, for 
example, the military did not conduct hearings to determine whether the Af-
ghans swept up during the conflict (and handed in for $5000 bounties) were 
properly characterized as enemies.78 
Often illiterate, without English language skills or experience with any legal 
system, these detainees have had no meaningful opportunity to demonstrate 
innocence, and few advocates to protest their improper detention. Detainees 
have been held in the Naval Brig at Charleston, South Carolina,79 Guantanamo 
Bay Cuba,80 and secret CIA-run "black sites" scattered around the world.81 
Coercive interrogations, rising to levels widely recognized as torture, have been 
confirmed at many of these overseas detention sites. 82 The Bush Administration 
78. See generally_ JosEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PREsIDENTIAL POWER (2006); 
DAVID RosE, GUANTANAMO: THE WAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS 13-22, 33-41 (2004); Tim Golden, Administra-
tion Officials Split Over Stalled Military Tribunals, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 25, 2004, at Al ; Tim Golden & 
Don van Natta, Jr., U.S. Said to Overstate Value of Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 2004, 
at Al. 
79. See Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673 (D.S.C. 2005). 
80. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) (mem.). 
81. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; Debate ls Growing Within Agency 
About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11, WASH. PosT, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al ; 
Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; 'Stress and Duress ' 
Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. PosT, Dec. 26, 2002, at 
Al. 
82. See generally MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON 
TERROR (2004). 
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holds detainees as presidentially designated "enemy combatants"-a category now 
applied without precedent in modem military operations or international law.83 
Protecting physical liberty against executive detention historically has been at 
the heart of the Judiciary's role.84 As Supreme Court Justice David Souter 
recently explained, "[f]or reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of 
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest 
the Nation's entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and 
the cost in liberty on the way to victory."85 But the administration has fiercely 
resisted any and all judicial oversight of detention operations, arguing that even 
U.S. citizens detained in the United States as "enemy combatants" are entitled 
to only minimal due process, and certainly not to an opportunity to examine and 
challenge the legal and factual bases for their detention. 86 
Justice Souter's insight is confirmed by journalistic reports of the principles 
of counterterrorism decisionmaking that have been recently adopted. According 
to one journalist, the Administration has acted on the principle that "a one 
percent chance of a catastrophe must be treated 'as certainty,"' with preventa-
tive action taken accordingly.87 Unsurprisingly, this approach has yielded an 
overwhelming proportion of false positives among detainees, rendering the need 
for judicial oversight more pressing. Moreover, international condemnation of 
American detention and interrogation practices is damaging counterterrorism 
efforts.88 Given these trends, judicial review for both domestic and at least some 
offshore facilities appears to be increasingly likely. 
A tangle of thorny legal questions, however, obscures the proper venue and 
scope of judicial review in these detention cases. Essentially, there are three 
pivotal legal questions raised by detainee policy. First, what is the legal regime 
that governs interdiction and detention operations under counterterrorism aus-
pices: Is it some part of the law of war, 89 or is it the civilian criminal law?90 
83. See In re Guantanamo, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 450 (defining "enemy combatant") (quoting Memoran-
dum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding Order Establishing Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal to the Secretary of the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/ 
d20040707review.pdt). See generally Major Richard B. Baxter, So-Called "Un-privileged Belliger-
ency": Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 340 (1951); W. Thomas Mallison 
& Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular Combatants Under the International Humanitar-
ian Law of Armed Conflict, 9 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 39 (1977). 
84. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (preventing 
suspension of habeas corpus except "in cases of rebellion or invasion"). 
85. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, 
and concurring in the judgment). 
86. See generally Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696). 
87. RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA'S PuRsurr OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 
9/11, at 150 (2006). 
88. Cf Aziz Huq, Extraordinary Rendition and the Wages of Hypocrisy, 23 WORLD PoL'Y J. 25, 
28-32 (2006) (discussing the foreign policy consequences of extraordinary rendition). 
89. For an examination of the law of war related to detention issues, see generally MICHAEL BYERS, 
WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 127-35 (2006). 
90. But see BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEmRE nm NEXT ATTACK: PR!lsERVING CJvn. LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF ThRROR-
ISM 13--72 (2<ni) (criticizing the dichotomy between "war" and "criminal" approaches to counterterrorism). 
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And, if the law of war applies, which laws-specifically, which parts of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions-govem?91 Second, if a detainee falls outside the 
ambit of the criminal law and is detained either here or overseas, can federal 
courts hear challenges to detention, and, if so, how can they do so effectively? 
Finally, when a person is properly detained under the laws of war, especially 
outside areas that traditionally would have been designated as battlefields, what 
process ought properly be used to determine whether that person is guilty of a 
criminal offense? A trilogy of Supreme Court cases in 200492 and a fourth case 
decided in June 200693 have cast light on some of these issues, but much 
remains unclear. 
On the first question, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld the Supreme Court concluded that 
individuals detained on a foreign battlefield bearing arms against the United 
States are properly subject to the laws of war.94 Application of the laws of war 
means that an "enemy combatant" detained on the battlefield may be detained 
for the length of the relevant territorial conflict. 95 Hamdi left open the very 
important question of whether the "enemy combatant" designation could be 
extended beyond the battlefield context. Further, in the 2006 Hamdan case, the 
Court held that all detainees are entitled to the protections of Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions, which guarantees, among other things, that sen-
tences and executions can be carried out only upon "previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees 
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."96 The laws of war, 
including some parts of the Geneva Conventions, thus apply to foreign battle-
field captures.97 
Second, courts to date have rejected executive branch arguments that the 
judicial branch must refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Thus, the Supreme 
Court rejected government arguments that the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is 
beyond judicial ken. 98 One district court has also concluded that jurisdiction 
obtains when the United States collaborates with another sovereign.99 Once 
91. See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, ls the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 
CORNELL L. REv. 97, 124-29 (2004) (discussing the extent to which the Geneva Conventions are 
self-executing). 
92. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
93. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
94. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-19 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
95. In Hamdi, the relevant territorial conflict was the ground war in Afghanistan. See id. at 518, 521. 
96. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135). 
97. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-20 (plurality opinion); see also Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649, 
1649 (2006) (mem.) (declining certiorari review to petition from "enemy combatant" detained in 
United States). 
98. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). 
99. See Abu Ali v. Aschroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 59-61 (D.D.C. 2004) (explaining that the United 
States does not evade liability for constitutional violations by acting in collaboration with foreign 
government). 
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jurisdiction is established, however, how challenges to the factual and legal 
bases of detention can and should be brought remains unclear. Citizen detainees 
are at least entitled to a judicial hearing to ascertain whether they are in fact 
"enemy combatants."100 Hamdi gave some clues to the form procedures might 
take. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Hamdi-compliant hearings have yet 
been convened, and the precise form of such hearings has yet to be definitively 
defined by the Judiciary. 101 Much rests on the precise quanta of fact-finding 
permitted in challenges to government accusations of terrorist activity. 
Finally, the Hamdan Court held that military commissions established to 
determine guilt or innocence of war crimes charges were invalid and that such 
commissions must comport with procedural standards established by the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions.102 
These cases leave much undecided. Procedures to determine "enemy combat-
ant" status, as well as the scope of that term, remain unclear. The aforemen-
tioned cases also focused on the fact of detention, not the conditions of 
detention. After the Court in Hamdi affirmed detainees' right to counsel, issues 
concerning conditions of detention have largely been addressed in the context of 
requests by lawyers for access to their clients. Although Congress could step in 
and usefully clarify these questions, one intervention in December 2005 was a 
manifest moral and practical failure. 103 That law purported to curtail federal 
court jurisdiction over actions arising out of Guantanamo and reflected a 
factually inaccurate premise that habeas litigation out of Guantanamo was 
similar to frivolous prison conditions challenges. 104 The legislation was con-
strued narrowly in Hamdan. 105 
Even if Congress does not act, the federal courts have ample resources to 
determine the propriety of initial detentions, and the military justice system has 
the ability to hold war crimes trials safely and fairly. 106 The optimal solution to 
the detention thicket thus is one that has been staring the nation in the face all 
along: employing the federal courts ' and their military counterparts' long-
respected capacity to mete out equitable and procedurally fair justice that will 
be respected around the world. 
Yet, not long before this Essay went to print, Congress approved and the 
100. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536--37 (plurality opinion). 
101. See id. at 538; In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 465-78 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(mem.). 
102. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 (2006) (Stevens, J. , plurality opinion). See 
generally Neal K. Katya! & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military 
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (exploring the constitutionality of military tribunals). 
103. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001--06, 119 Stat. 2680, 
2739-44. 
104. See id. § 1005(c), 119 Stat. at 2742. 
105. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2765--69. 
106. See generally SERRIN ThRNER & STEPHEN J. ScHULHOFER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JusncE AT NYU 
Sett. OF LAw, THE SECRECY PROBLEM IN ThRRoRISM TRIALs (2005). 
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President signed a far-reaching omnibus measure addressing the scope of 
detention authority, the kinds of tactics that could be used in interrogations, and 
the scope of post-hoc judicial review. Entitled the Military Commissions Act of 
2006 (MCA), 107 this Act purported to respond to Hamdan but in fact swept 
much further. With respect to access to the federal courts, the MCA professes to 
eliminate jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by or on behalf of 
noncitizens designated as "enemy combatants" by the Executive. 108 The Admin-
istration has argued that a noncitizen assigned the vague designation of "await-
ing determination" as an "enemy combatant" is also covered by this habeas-
stripping provision109-suggesting that the Administration's intent is to detain 
individuals without designating them "enemy combatants." If the government 
prevails, neither detainees at Guantanamo nor noncitizens swept up and de-
tained as "enemy combatants" in the American heartland will have any meaning-
ful opportunity to challenge the factual or legal basis of their detention by 
habeas corpus. The MCA further purports to eliminate all other actions that an 
alien "enemy combatant" might bring in federal court, 110 leaving open the 
possibility that victims of torture, or other abusive interrogation measures, 
would have no civil remedy in a U.S. court. 
B. THE GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN 
REVIEWING DECISIONS APPL YING IMMIGRATION LAW 
Judicial review has long played an important role in immigration law and 
remains an important safeguard of individual rights against the misuse of 
government power. During the past decade, however, the government has 
repeatedly attempted to restrict immigrants' access to the courts. Moreover, 
various jurisdiction-stripping provisions have been coupled with measures ren-
dering even long-term residents deportable for minor infractions, emphasizing 
security at any cost. Although the Supreme Court has helped preserve judicial 
review, access to the courts has decreased and remains vulnerable to future 
limitations. 
In 1996, Congress enacted two statutes that sought to significantly restrict 
immigrants' access to the federal courts: the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA)111 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 112 AEDPA, passed in response to the Oklahoma 
City bombing of 1995, contained many anti-immigrant provisions (though the 
107. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
108. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7(a). Thus far, one district court has agreed with the 
government and upheld the MCA's repeal of habeas jurisdiction over the petitions of Guantanamo 
detainees. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-1519 (JR), 2006 WL 3625015, at *9 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 
2006). 
109. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 WL 3625015, at *I. 
ll0. See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 950j(b), 120 Stat. at 2623-24. 
lll. Pub. L. No. 104-132, ll0 Stat. 1214 (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA] . 
ll2. Pub. L. No. 104-208, ll0 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA]. 
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attack was the work of homegrown terrorists), including limits on judicial 
review. 113 IIRIRA, enacted several months after AEDPA, contained additional 
anti-immigrant measures. It not only eliminated court review over administra-
tive deportation decisions for noncitizens convicted of most criminal offenses, 
but also curtailed the availability of important forms of relief from deportation 
that took into account individual circumstances. 114 These provisions, moreover, 
were applied retroactively, thus penalizing noncitizens for minor infractions 
committed decades before without any independent review or individualized 
assessment of their claims. 115 In addition, the IIRIRA provided for the creation 
of a new "expedited removal" process which summarily turns away asylum 
seekers arriving at America's shores. 116 As human rights groups have docu-
mented, the "expedited removal" process has allowed the government to deny 
entry to people fleeing persecution without making an independent assessment 
of their claims. 117 
The Supreme Court's 2001 decision in INS v. St. Cyr118 reaffirmed the 
importance of judicial review in immigration cases. The Court held that AEDPA 
and IIRIRA did not eliminate federal habeas corpus review over deportation 
orders119 and that restrictions on relief from deportation did not apply retroac-
tively to cases pending before the statutes' enactments. 12° Further demonstrating 
the importance of judicial review, the Court ruled in another case that term that 
the INS could not indefinitely detain noncitizens in the United States. 121 St. 
Cyr's importance has reverberated beyond immigration law, providing an impor-
tant precedent for federal court review of the executive detention of individuals 
at Guantanamo Bay after September 11th. 122 
However, court decisions have neither resolved all limits on judicial review 
nor ended the push for further restrictions. The terrorist attacks of September 
11th prompted the dissolution of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
and its replacement with the Department of Homeland Security, 123 which has 
placed even greater emphasis on security at the expense of court access for 
113. See AEDPA §§ 401-43. 
114. See IIRIRA tit. III, §§ 301-88 (Inspection, Apprehension, Detention, Adjudication, and Re-
moval of Inadmissible and Deportable Aliens). 
115. See RONALD WEICH, ACLU, UPSETTING CHECKS AND BALANCES: CONGRESSIONAL HOSTILITY To-
w ARD THE COURTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS 30 (2001) ( citing the example of a mother of two who was deported 
for a previous conviction of shoplifting fifteen dollars of merchandise when she tried to return baby 
clothes without a receipt, notwithstanding her pending application for citizenship and steady work 
history). 
116. See IIRIRA § 302(a). 
117. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Is THis AMERICA? THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS ro 
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2000). 
118. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
119. See id. at 308-14. 
120. See id. at 315, 326. 
121. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001). 
122. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,474 (2004) (relying on St. Cyr). 
123. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205. 
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asylum seekers and other immigrants. 124 In addition, streamlining regulations 
adopted in August 2002125 weakened the system of internal administrative 
review of immigration judge decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA), decreasing the BIA's size by over half, making disposition of appeals by 
a single BIA member (rather than a panel of three) the norm, and encouraging 
the issuance of opinions without analysis of the claims. 126 The regulations have 
increased pressure on federal appeals courts and helped prompt calls for further 
limits on judicial review even though, as Judge Richard Posner of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggested last year, such review 
is necessary to correct the BIA's "staggering" error rate. 127 
In 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, which eliminated one of the 
ways in which immigrants adjudged deportable could seek court review of the 
BIA's decisions. 128 Recently proposed legislation threatens to further undermine 
immigrants' access to the courts by imposing procedural obstacles to meaning-
ful consideration of removal decisions and by restricting review of denials of 
citizenship petitions. 129 
In sum, while Congress and the Executive have broad powers to set U.S. 
immigration policy, 130 federal courts play an important role in ensuring that 
this power is exercised in accordance with the nation's laws and the Con-
stitution.131 Preserving immigrants' access to the courts thus safeguards both 
individual liberty and the separation of powers against unlawful government 
action. 
C. THE FUNCTION OF THE COURTS IN REVIEWING CLAIMS OF PRISONERS CHALLENGING 
THE CONDITIONS OF IMPRISONMENT HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY CIRCUMSCRIBED 
In 1996, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)132 in an 
attempt to reduce the volume of prison conditions cases reaching the federal 
courts. Underlying the law were the beliefs that the courts were being clogged 
by prison conditions cases, that most of the cases were frivolous, and that the 
reason so many cases were being brought was that prisoners have too much 
time on their hands. 
124. See, e.g., Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy ls Reshaping Immigration 
Policy, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1173, 1190, 1228 (2004) (describing the adverse impact on asylum seekers). 
125. See 8 C.F.R. § 3 (2005). 
126. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of 
Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 459, 474-75 (2006). 
127. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005). 
128. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 310-11 ; Motomura, supra 
note 126, at 486-88. 
129. See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437, 
109th Cong. § 609 (2005). 
130. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). 
131. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941--42 (1983). 
132. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
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The PLRA contained a number of separate measures aimed at reducing the 
volume of prison litigation, three of which we will mention here: 133 
• a reduction in the amount of attorneys' fees available to attorneys 
representing prisoners in conditions cases; 
• a requirement that prisoners exhaust all available internal grievance 
procedures (regardless of how strict or cumbersome those procedures 
are) prior to filing a federal lawsuit; and 
• a requirement that prisoners who have had three cases dismissed as 
lacking in merit, frivolous, or malicious pay the full filing fee in all 
future cases, regardless of their ability to pay. 
The PLRA has achieved its goal of reducing the quantity of prison litigation 
in the federal courts, but at high cost. 134 The high number of prison conditions 
cases had stemmed from a number of factors. First, all aspects of a prisoner's 
life are under the control of prison authorities, and prisoners have very few 
ways of influencing the conditions of their confinement other than litigation 
(they generally cannot, for example, vote). 135 Second, it is not uncommon for 
prisoners to suffer serious violations of their constitutional rights, including rape 
and other violence by prisoners and prison personnel. 136 The sharp rise in the 
prison population in the past few decades was also a major factor underlying the 
rise in prisoner litigation. 137 Finally, prisoners were perceived as having unlim-
ited time to pursue lawsuits ( even though many also refrained from pursuing 
legitimate claims out of fear of retaliation by prison authorities). 
The available data indicates that the PLRA has made it more difficult-and in 
some cases impossible-for prisoners to bring meritorious lawsuits. For ex-
133. In addition to the provisions discussed here, there are several other provisions of the PLRA. 
Two that have been particularly criticized as interfering with the power of the courts are a provision 
barring prisoners from seeking damages for mental and emotional injuries in the absence of physical 
injuries, and another provision sharply limiting the conditions under which federal courts can enter 
consent decrees in prison conditions cases. See generally John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform 
Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 429 (2001). 
134. According to a recent study, in the four years following the PLRA's enactment, federal civil 
lawsuits by prisoners dropped by forty percent. Brian J. Ostrom et al., Congress, Courts and Correc-
tions: An Empirical Perspective on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NO'I"RE DAME L. REv. 1525, 
1525-26 (2003). 
135. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, ll6 HARV. L. REv. 1555, 1574 (2003) (citing Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 4ll U.S. 475,492 (1973)). 
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 15601(2), (13) (Supp. III 2003) (finding that "experts have conservatively 
estimated that at least 13 percent of the inmates in the United States have been sexually assaulted in 
prison," and that the rapes involve "actual and potential violations of the United States Constitution"); 
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. ll46, ll60-61 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing the "tremendous potential 
for abuse" of prisoners in prison, and finding that, in one particular California prison, there has been "a 
conspicuous pattern of excessive force"); Joyce Kosak, Comment, Mental Health Treatment and 
Mistreatment in Prison, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 389, 399-404 (2005) (describing the pervasive 
failure of prisons to provide constitutionally adequate mental health treatment). 
137. See Schlanger, supra note 135, at 1586-87. 
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ample, the exhaustion requirement has operated to bar prisoners from challeng-
ing injuries received in prison merely because those injuries sent them to the 
hospital during the entire short period during which they could have filed a 
grievance. 138 The attorneys' fee award provision, together with a ban on pris-
oner representation by all lawyers receiving any federal LSC funding, has made 
it impossible for most prisoners to find legal representation, thereby sharply 
reducing their chances of prevailing in meritorious cases. 139 It thus appears that 
the PLRA took an overly blunt approach to the task of curbing frivolous 
litigation, with the result that a highly vulnerable and disempowered prison 
population is now less able to obtain court protection than ever. 
VI. THE INCREASED RELIANCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLlJTION METHODS 
RAISES NEW CONCERNS 
The courts need not be understood as the exclusive forum for the enforce-
ment of laws or resolution of disputes. Litigation can be prohibitively expen-
sive, complex, and time-consuming. Presumably, there could and should be less 
expensive, faster, and no less fair systems for resolving disputes pursuant to the 
rule of law. At the very least, there is a need to simplify litigation. Alternative 
dispute resolution systems, such as mediation and arbitration, appear to offer 
one such opportunity. 140 
In fact, courts offer litigants the opportunity to participate in mediation 
proceedings as an option prior to proceeding with full litigation, and some also 
offer binding arbitration as an alternative to litigation. But the private nature of 
these proceedings, compared to litigation, which is public in nature and creates 
a public record, has generated concern. Decisions are made without the sanitiz-
ing effects of public scrutiny. Moreover, the law itself, which in the normal 
course would evolve to reflect the decisions made in litigation, does not have 
the opportunity to change and develop in response to outcomes and insights 
developed off the record. 141 
Distinct from these court-affiliated alternatives to litigation is the increased 
inclusion of binding arbitration clauses-promises made by individuals that 
they will not sue in court but rather submit any dispute for resolution by a 
private arbitration organization-in a broad range of contracts. In many con-
texts, including consumer contracts and employment agreements, 142 binding 
138. Id. at 1653-54 & n.332. 
139. See id. at 1654-57. 
140. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Our Couns, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 165 (2003) (providing a 
history of the development of alternative dispute resolution methodologies). 
141. See id. at 187. 
142. It has been estimated that as of 2002, about ten to twenty percent of the workforce was covered 
by a mandatory arbitration agreement. See Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary 
Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 
CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1209 (2002) (citing Charlie Cray, See you in . . . Arbitration?, MULTINAT'L MONITOR, 
1152 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 95: 1127 
arbitration clauses prohibit recourse to the courts. 143 
Such arbitration requirements have been shown to be problematic for a 
variety of reasons. First, low-income people typically have little negotiating 
leverage when entering into agreements with employers, credit card companies, 
and many other entities. They cannot realistically expect to alter the terms of 
such clauses or decline to agree to them. 144 Second, the substantial administra-
tive costs of arbitration processes may and generally do exceed those of the civil 
court system. 145 Third, arbitration agreements increasingly include mandatory 
collective action waivers. These provisions prohibit individuals from joining 
forces to advance their claims together through class action litigation, even 
though such collective action sometimes offers the best and most efficient 
option for recovery (particularly if the sum due is not so substantial as to induce 
any individual to proceed alone). 146 Fourth, in many contexts, arbitrators have 
been shown to develop a bias in favor of so-called repeat players. 147 Finally, as 
noted above, arbitration clauses are designed to preclude appeal to the courts. 
When binding arbitration agreements lead to unjust results, there is little 
opportunity to set them aside. Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, the scope of a court's review of such agreements is 
generally restricted to the narrow question of whether the arbitration provision 
Dec. l , 2000, at 4; David E. Feller, Putting Gilmer Where it Belongs: The FAA s Labor Exemption, 18 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 253, 253 (2000)). 
143. A recent study of 161 businesses across 37 industries from which consumers make expensive or 
ongoing purchases found that 35.4% of those businesses included mandatory arbitration clauses in their 
consumer contracts. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumers Experience, 67 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoas. 55, 
62 (2004). The study found use of arbitration agreements in each of the following categories: Home 
Repair/Remodeling, Homeowners' Insurance, Apartment Rental, Renters ' Insurance, Real Estate, Inter-
net Service, Online Retail, Auto Purchase/Lease, Gas Card, Auto Insurance, Health Insurance, Health 
Club, Tour Operator, Credit Card (general, airline, store), Banking, Investments, Accountant/fax 
Consultant, Attorney, and Cellular Telephone. Id. at 63 tbl. 2. 
144. See generally Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PRoas. 133 (2004); Julia A. Scarpino, Mandatory Arbitration of Consumer Disputes: A 
Proposal to Ease the Financial Burden on Low-Income Consumers, IO AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & 
L. 679 (2002); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and 
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33. 
145. See Pua. CITIZEN, THE CosTS OF ARBITRATION 42-51 (2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/ 
documents/ ACF! IOA.PDF. 
146. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modem Class Action, 104 M1cH. L. REv. 373, 378 (2005) (citing David Rosenberg, Decoupling 
Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REv. 
1871, 1906 n.62 (2002), and arguing that class actions serve the important role of aggregating small 
claims). These collective action waivers also serve as a bar to collective action in the arbitration 
context, precluding individuals from aggregating their claims in that forum as well. See Demaine & 
Hensler, supra note 143, at 66 (stating that just over thirty percent of surveyed arbitration clauses 
precluded collective action in arbitration proceedings). Courts have generally upheld these collective 
action waivers. See Gilles, supra, at 400 nn.137 & 139 (surveying state and federal court decisions 
regarding the unconscionability of arbitration provisions that waive class action rights). 
147. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMP. 
PoL'Y J. 189, 205-10 (1997) (finding that employers who are repeat players at arbitration do better in 
arbitration than employers who arbitrate only once). 
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itself, as contrasted with the broader substantive contract terms, was obtained by 
fraud, duress, or unconscionability. 148 This is an extremely high threshold for a 
party seeking court review to meet. 
CONCLUSION 
To stabilize our courts, assure their independence, and secure meaningful 
access so that all the members of our society can resolve their critical legal 
needs, a commitment is required by all of us. Inadequate access to the courts 
harms the court system itself and the citizenry's respect for the rule of law. 
When segments of the public believe that the courts are unfair to the poor, or 
that the courts treat communities of color with hostility, the courts lose legiti-
macy. Not only do courts suffer as institutions, but the nation's promise of 
"equal justice for all" is broken. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]here can 
be no equal justice where the kind of trial a inan gets depends on the amount of 
money he has." 149 The following specific reform initiatives aim to address and 
correct this fundamental problem: 
Provide essential funding for the federal Legal Services Corporation. The 
ABA has recommended that LSC requires $495 million for fiscal year 2007. 150 
That is the minimum that should be provided. 
Remove federal restrictions that apply to the Legal Services Corporation 
and its grantees, including the restrictions that encumber non-federal 
funds. These funding restrictions undercut effective representation of low-
income clients by lawyers in programs that receive LSC funding. 
Ensure access to counsel in civil cases in which basic human needs are at 
stake. In a formal resolution adopted unanimously in August 2006, the ABA 
urges governmental authorities at all levels to provide counsel to low-income 
individuals in important civil cases, including those in which shelter, suste-
nance, safety, health, or child custody are at issue. 151 Other nations have 
recognized that it is vital either to provide counsel or to simplify procedures and 
substantive law to the point where counsel is not necessary. The United States 
needs to do more in both areas. 
Authorize appropriate awards of attorneys' fees so that civil rights suits 
will not be discouraged. Our federal and state governments need to adopt 
policies that authorize appropriate awards of attorneys' fees sufficient to enable 
low-income people to obtain qualified counsel to represent them in claims to 
enforce their civil legal rights and promote the rule of law. 
148. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204, 1209 (2006). 
149. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). 
150. LSC Funding Request for 2007, DIALOGUE, Winter 2006, at 1, 23, available at http:// 
www.abanet.org/legalservices/dia1ogue/downloads/dialogue2006win.pdf. 
151. AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT ro THE HousE OF DELEGATES No. 112A (2006), available at http:// 
www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A 112A. pdf. 
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Provide essential funding and superv1s10n for state indigent defense 
services. The promise of Gideon v. Wainwright has been deferred for too long. 
Our states need to ensure that low-income persons charged with crimes receive 
defense counsel who are adequately financed, properly trained and supervised, 
and accountable to appropriate practice standards. 
Guarantee access to the courts for people with disabilities. The ADA 
promises access to public buildings, including the courts. We need a national 
commitment by federal and state governments to finance meaningful access for 
people with physical and psychiatric disabilities to all of our nation's court-
rooms. 
Guarantee access to the courts for people with limited English profi-
ciency. People who are learning English are also entitled to equal justice, and 
the society and the courts are better off when laws are enforced evenly and 
disputes resolved pursuant to the rule of law. We need our federal government 
and state governments to commit sufficient resources to ensure that translation 
and interpretation services make it possible for all members of our society to 
participate equally in court proceedings. 
Correct the excesses of court-stripping. Too many people are denied access 
to the courts by judicial decisions and laws that limit the jurisdiction of the 
courts. We need our courts, and our elected leaders, to appreciate the destabiliz-
ing consequences of rules that place the courts out of reach of the most 
vulnerable members of our society. 
Control the excesses of alternative dispute resolution requirements. Al-
though alternatives to litigation are desirable, new problems can be created by 
policies that favor private mediation or promote the complete waiver of litiga-
tion rights. We need to examine the societal consequences for the rule of law of 
taking disputes out of our public courts and promoting their resolution by 
non-judges in private settings. Where binding arbitration is authorized, we need 
to be sure that the terms are fair, that the decisionmakers are unbiased, and that 
judicial resolution remains available when necessary to preserve justice. 
